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Abstract 
Directive 2008/48/EC aims to guarantee a high level of consumer protection and comparability of 
consumer credit offers, protecting consumers against over-indebtedness. In light of the ongoing 
review of this directive, it is important to consider whether the principle of transparency could not 
play a bigger role in ensuring that consumers are provided with understandable consumer credit 
information. The authors argue, therefore, that the assessment of the credit information’s 
transparency should go beyond a mere compliance check with formal aspects of transparency, i.e. 
whether consumers had access to the information and whether it was legible. At least an equal 
amount of consideration should be paid to aspects of the substantive transparency, i.e. whether 
consumers ultimately understood the information. Moreover, the European Commission should 
strengthen the consumer credit transparency toolbox by explaining the meaning and significance of 




In the majority of the Member States of the European Union the number of over-indebted 
households has significantly increased in the past five years.1 Over-indebtedness entails the inability 
of individuals to meet their financial obligations and often is the result of consumers purchasing 
goods on credit.2 For society as a whole, over-indebtedness of consumers has severe economic and 
social consequences, as it negatively impacts consumption, employment, and can lead to austerity 
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measures like social welfare cuts or an increase of taxes.3 With the aim of alleviating the problem of 
over-indebtedness, European consumer law has adopted a variety of preventive and corrective 
measures. These measures include inter alia information obligations, the duty of responsible 
lending, standardisation of the calculation of credit costs, the right of withdrawal and the early 
repayment of credit.4 Amongst these, information duties are the main consumer protection tool 
used by the European legislator in the area of consumer credit. This regulatory choice is based on 
the belief that, if given adequate information regarding consumer credit, consumers will be able to 
compare credit offers available on the market, decide whether they want to conclude a particular 
credit agreement5 and, after they have concluded it, know how to enforce their contractual rights.6  
Aside tackling over-indebtedness, Directive 2008/48/EC (further: CCD)7 aims to ensure 
greater market competitiveness and promote confidence in the use of consumer credit, as well as to 
secure contractual fairness.8 In order to achieve these goals, it largely relies on the instrument of 
information obligations.9 This paper adds to the previous criticism of information obligations as an 
effective consumer protection measure,10 by stressing the importance of the proper interpretation 
and application of transparency requirements, in order for information obligations to even have a 
chance of fulfilling their goals. It identifies and presents solutions to three main inconsistencies in 
the current application of the principle of transparency in the consumer credit area: the lack of 
clarity as to the formal or substantive character of its requirements; the disconnected nomenclature 
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of these requirements; and, the confused application of standardised information in credit 
disclosures. 
As previous research has shown, many consumers do not read financial contracts and even if 
they do, they generally struggle to understand them.11 In its Study on consumer vulnerability in the 
European Union, the European Commission (further: Commission) recognised that many consumers 
were vulnerable in the financial sector, including those who could be considered sophisticated in 
other sectors.12 This is due to various reasons, such as consumers having difficulties processing 
complicated financial information, lacking financial literacy and experience in purchasing financial 
products.13 Furthermore, consumers are often provided with insufficient or misleading information 
and rarely given adequate explanations of the risk that certain financial products entail.14 In order to 
enable consumers to consider the information provided by credit providers, when choosing between 
credit offers available on the market, they have to (at least) be given information they can 
reasonably be expected to understand. Although scholars have heavily criticised the information 
paradigm,15 even its harshest critics have admitted that the way in which information is presented 
influences the ability of consumers to understand it.16 Moreover, even if it could be argued that 
consumers overwhelmingly do not read terms and conditions,17 they pay some attention to core 
terms, like the cost of credit.18 Therefore, it seems necessary to further explore whether adherence 
to the principle of transparency could increase consumers’ chances of understanding at least the 
essential (pre-)contractual information. 
Whilst information transparency is an important element of European consumer credit law, 
quite ironically, there is a significant lack of clarity as to what constitutes a transparent provision of 
the credit information, which is a gap this paper addresses. The authors’ first main claim is that an 
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assessment of the credit providers’ compliance with the principle of transparent disclosure should 
always include both substantive and formal transparency requirements. The distinction between 
formal and substantive transparency has been recognised in legal scholarship as a differentiation 
between transparency of form and content in providing consumer information.19 This paper, re-
assessing that distinction, argues in favour of a closer relationship between formal and substantive 
transparency requirements in consumer credit law. The authors achieve this through the careful 
consideration of when the principle of transparency could best contribute to the achievement of the 
European legislator’s objectives, which supported the adoption of the CCD.  
An example of foreign currency loans may demonstrate well the significance of consumers 
obtaining understandable information on credit conditions for ensuring contract fairness and 
preventing over-indebtedness, and thus the significance of substantive transparency. Such loans 
encompass borrowing money in or linked to a currency that differs from the one in which consumers 
receive their income, meaning that the exact amount of payable credit depends on the fluctuation of 
the foreign currency on the market. Thus, any appreciation of the foreign currency will increase the 
cost of the consumer credit. For this reason, the Court of Justice of the EU (further: CJEU) in the 
Andriciuc case considered that credit providers did not satisfy the transparency requirement when 
they only informed consumers of the link between the foreign currency and the currency in which 
they receive their income, in the calculation of the amount of credit. Instead, the CJEU expects credit 
providers to illustrate the kind of risk consumers are taking on when borrowing in a foreign currency, 
by showing them the possible variations in the exchange rate and their economic impact.20 
The Andriciuc case is just one of the recent examples of the CJEU’s case law indicating that 
credit providers will not be considered to comply with the transparency requirements by giving 
consumers just any kind of credit information.21 However, the CJEU has not yet made express claims 
supporting the assessment of the substantive transparency on the basis of the CCD’s provisions. 
Additionally, the European Commission has so far interpreted transparency requirements as 
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Law Compendium: The Consumer Acquis and its transposition in the Member States (Sellier 2008) 245-246; 
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elements of the formal transparency test. The core of this paper is to present arguments for the 
revision of this policy line.  
Moreover, the paper will explore various transparency requirements, requesting that the 
consumer information is of a certain quality – clear, concise and prominent.22 The authors make a 
second claim in this paper that whilst all these requirements currently represent either formal or 
substantive transparency, the European legislator has not identified their specific character, which 
weakens the coherency of the legislator’s toolbox and lowers legal certainty. At the moment, it is 
not easy to classify these concepts as requirements of either formal or substantive transparency.  
The third claim pertains to the use of the standardised information form in consumer credit 
disclosures. The authors will appeal for more studies on the effectiveness of standardised disclosures 
to take place. If they would indeed confirm the positive impact of such disclosures on the 
consumers’ understanding of credit conditions and their consequences, then standardisation should 
become a pillar of consumer credit disclosures rather than its ornament. It should also then apply 
not only to the form of the credit information but also to its content. 
To substantiate the claims presented here, the authors first discuss the objectives of the CCD 
(part 2), in order to then analyse in light of those objectives what information credit providers have 
to disclose (part 3), and how to convey this information in a transparent manner (part 4). The 
authors give examples of how to overcome the three above-mentioned inconsistencies of the 
principle of transparency: the lack of clarity as to the formal or substantive character of transparency 
requirements; their disconnected nomenclature; and, the confused application of the information 
standardisation (part 5). The critical analysis of the formal and substantive transparency 
requirements applicable to consumer credit agreements leads the authors to conclude with an 
appeal to the Commission to revise its guidelines on the application of the CCD23 in the ongoing 
review of this directive.24 The authors also address the CJEU, asking its judges in the meantime to 
carefully delineate between various transparency requirements and their relation to one another, 
not only in the case law interpreting provisions of the Directive 93/13/EEC (further: UCTD)25. 
 
2. Double assessment: formal and substantive transparency 
The main objective of the CCD is twofold – contributing to the development of a more transparent 
and effective consumer credit market, and ensuring a high level of consumer protection in this 
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area.26 Interestingly, recitals to the CCD do not mention the fight against consumers’ over-
indebtedness as one of the aspects of the harmonised European consumer credit protection. The 
risk of over-indebtedness is only mentioned in Recital 26 CCD, which entitles the Member States to 
adopt additional information obligations and educational strategies to protect national consumers 
against such a risk. In this paper we will provide examples of how some Member States used the 
principle of transparency to improve the provision of credit information to consumers and give 
effect to the principle of responsible lending. However, we also stipulate that the CCD’s objective of 
ensuring a high level of consumer protection could not be fully realised without accounting for the 
risk of over-indebtedness and that there is an implied link between the provision of credit 
information to consumers and that risk. 
Also the CJEU perceived the provision of adequate credit information as instrumental in the 
achievement of both above-mentioned goals at the EU level.27 For example, with regards to 
standardisation, and more precisely, the role of the Annual Percentage Rate (further: APR), the CJEU 
explained that the APR is supposed to contribute to the openness of the market, by making it easier 
for consumers to compare credit offers, and to enable individual consumers to evaluate the extent 
of their obligations.28 Whilst the CJEU did not refer in these cases directly to the consumers’ need to 
understand a credit contract they are concluding and its consequences, such an inference could be 
drawn from the credit providers’ obligation to facilitate the evaluation of the consumers’ scope of 
contractual obligations.29 
The two goals mentioned by the CJEU will not be achieved by the provision of just any 
information, but only if the transparency principle is adhered to, in both its formal and substantive 
expression. Formal transparency refers to the availability and style of information. In principle, it 
requires that credit providers give consumers relevant information before the contract’s conclusion 
and in a manner that enables them to actually read, understand and base their decision on this 
information. Therefore, credit providers should not hide information, by, e.g. drafting it in a small 
font or burying the information in other documentation.30 Furthermore, the drafting style should not 
make it difficult for consumers to get an overview of the contract, by, e.g. frequent cross-referencing 
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28 Radlinger and Radlingerová (fn 27). 
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the CCD, see e.g. Case C-26/13 Kásler EU:C:2014:282, paras 73-75; Case C-143/13 Matei EU:C:2015:127, paras 
74-75. 
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or excessive length.31 The information is formally transparent if it draws consumers’ attention. 
Substantive transparency seems to require consumers’ comprehension, both of the credit contract 
terms, as well as of the foreseeable consequences arising from the contract’s conclusion.32 The 
information is substantively transparent if it is drafted in a manner that facilitates consumers’ 
understanding of their contractual rights and obligations. This will not be the case, e.g. when credit 
providers use complex, mathematical formulas to explain credit rates. The authors’ understanding of 
the difference between formal and substantive transparency is, therefore, that, even if the credit 
information is formally transparent, consumers will not be able to understand it, unless it is also 
substantively transparent. Considering that insufficient financial literacy of consumers has been 
acknowledged as a problem at the EU level,33 it is especially relevant that core terms of a credit 
agreement are simplified and transparent.  
Moreover, it could be stipulated that more uniformity in the presentation of credit offers 
would facilitate further formal and substantive transparency. This was the Commission’s reasoning 
behind the introduction of a standardised method of calculation of the APR, but also the 
introduction of the Standard European Consumer Credit Information (further: SECCI).34 Such 
uniformity may aid consumers in comparing various credit offers and other credit information, 
advancing the consumers’ understanding thereof, and it could also simplify the finding of certain 
information in a contract.35  
Scholars have already recognised the instrumental role that transparent disclosures and 
standardisation play in the creation of consumers’ informed consent and ensuring greater market 
transparency.36 Unfortunately, current guidelines of the Commission on how to interpret different 
transparency requirements, as well as the CJEU’s case law in this area, blur the lines between the 
assessment of formal and substantive transparency. The following paragraphs discuss these 
inconsistencies and suggest how to remedy them. 
                                                   
31 Ebers (fn 19) 245-246. 
32 Loos (fn 19) 55. 
33 European Commission, ‘Financial Education’ (Communication) COM(2007)808 final 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2007/EN/1-2007-808-EN-F1-1.Pdf> accessed 25 April 2019; 
European Banking Federation, ‘Financial literacy – empowering consumers to make the right choices’ (EBF 
Report on Financial Literacy April 2009) <https://www.ebf.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/EBF_Financial_Education_-_rev7-26-9_webversion-2009-00831-01-E.pdf> accessed 
25 April 2019. Addressing the problem of the lack of consumers’ financial literacy is on the current European 
consumer agenda, see points 3.5. and 4.2. in European Commission, ‘A European Consumer Agenda - Boosting 
confidence and growth’ (Communication) COM(2012)0225 final <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2012:0225:FIN> accessed 25 April 2019. 
34 See Recitals 18 and 43 CCD.  
35 See e.g. Willis (fn 15) 749-754; Mak (fn 5) 256. 
36 Catherine Garcia and Willem H van Boom, ‘Information Disclosure in the EU Consumer Credit Directive: 
Opportunities and Limitations’, in James Devenney and Mel Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and 




3. Information requirements under the CCD – The What 
One of the most prominent features of the CCD is its information model. The amount and content of 
disclosure duties of credit providers depend on the stage of the (pre-)contractual process.37 We may 
distinguish three stages: advertising, the pre-contractual and the contractual stage.38 For each stage, 
the European legislator prescribed a separate, minimum list of mandatory information that has to be 
disclosed to consumers.  
In the advertising stage, Article 4 CCD stipulates the standard information that needs to be 
specified in any advertising of credit agreements, but only if this advertisement includes an interest 
rate or other figures regarding the cost of credit. In such a case the advertisement should include the 
information on: the borrowing rate, the total amount of credit, the APR, the cash price, the amount 
of advance payments in case of credit in the form of a deferred payment, the duration of the 
agreement, the total amount payable and the instalments’ amount. It is important to note that the 
list of information that has to be included in the advertising of a consumer credit is not exhaustive 
and the Member States are allowed to regulate advertising requirements other than the cost of the 
credit. They could, e.g. choose to provide additional information in a way facilitating responsible 
lending. 
In this initial phase of interesting consumers in a particular credit offer, the European 
legislator is mostly concerned with information requirements related to the credit’s cost, since 
standardisation of this core information could increase the comparability of credit offers.39 This, in 
turn, should contribute to the consumers’ better informed decision-making. Therefore, one of the 
biggest achievements of the CCD is the introduction of a uniform formula for the calculation of the 
credit’s cost – the APR. The APR is defined in Article 3 CCD as, ‘the total cost of the credit to the 
consumer, expressed as an annual percentage of the total amount of credit.’40  
With regards to the pre-contractual information, Article 5 CCD prescribes pre-contractual 
information requirements for credit agreements in general, whilst Article 6 CCD contains information 
requirements for specific agreements, such as a credit in the form of an overdraft facility. Credit 
providers need to give consumers nineteen pieces of information on credit’s terms and conditions, 
pursuant to Article 5(1) CCD. This information concerns the identity and contact details of a credit 
provider (and of a credit intermediary, where applicable), a description of the product’s main 
                                                   
37 Benöhr (fn 4) 117. 
38 Benöhr (fn 4) 117. 
39 Recital 18 and 19 CCD. 
40 The calculation details of the APR are laid down in Article 19 CCD, whilst the exact mathematical formula on 
the basis of which the APR is to be calculated is stipulated and explained in Annex I to the CCD. 
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features, the credit’s cost and other important legal aspects.41 This list also has the minimum 
mandatory character, i.e. it enumerates the information that cannot be omitted in pre-contractual 
disclosures. Article 5(1) CCD allows credit providers to provide consumers with additional 
information.42  
Article 6 CCD separately regulates information requirements for credit agreements in the 
form of an overdraft facility and other specific credit agreements.43 These credit agreements are 
subject to a lighter information model, supposedly limiting the burden on credit providers.44 
However, considering that credit providers still have to issue up to fourteen pieces of pre-
contractual information,45 the benefit seems to be minimal. This number slightly changes depending 
on the type of specific credit agreement that is offered.  
Article 10(2) CCD regulates the provision of contractual information for credit agreements in 
general and requires disclosure of twenty-two pieces of information. Article 10(5) CCD regulates the 
provision of contractual information in cases of specific credit agreements, such as overdraft 
facilities, and mandates the disclosure of nine pieces of information. Here, the lower information 
burden for credit providers of specific credit agreements is easily noticeable. 
 
4. Transparency requirements under the CCD – The How 
As shown above and in line with regulatory trends in other areas of consumer law,46 the information 
requirements under the CCD are numerous, detailed and, in most cases, not exhaustive. Moreover, 
although a number of information obligations have been placed on credit providers, it is not 
particularly clear how they should disclose this information for it to be transparent. Generally, 
policymakers and scholars view transparency as an attribute of information, which results in 
consumer understanding, without the need for consumers to seek explanations from the credit 
provider or third parties, as to the meaning and relevance of the information received.47 
This section identifies three transparency requirements under the CCD. The discussed 
requirements are the standard modalities for transparent disclosures: clarity, conciseness and 
prominence.48 As the CCD requires credit providers to give consumers a representative example of 
the credit they are interested in concluding, the authors analyse the role of these three transparency 
                                                   
41 This categorisation of information requirements is provided in the Standard European Consumer Credit 
Information form in Annex II to the CCD. 
42 Below we further address the impact of leaving an option to provide consumers with additional information. 
43 These specific agreements are enumerated in Articles 2(3), (5) and (6) CCD. 
44 Recital 23 CCD. 
45 Information requirements for specific agreements are prescribed in Articles 6(1)-(3) CCD. 
46 Schaub (fn 5) 26-27. 
47 Akos Rona-Tas and Alya Guseva, 'Information and Consumer Credit in Central and Eastern Europe' (2013) 
41(2) Journal of Comparative Economics 428. 
48 See e.g. Articles 4(3), 10(2) and (5) CCD. 
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requirements in such disclosures, as well. Finally, as the CCD promotes standardisation of disclosures 
as a means of increasing their transparency, the last paragraph in this section assesses the link 
between standardisation and the assessment of formal and substantive transparency. 
 
4.1. Clarity, conciseness and prominence 
According to the guidelines provided by the European Commission, credit information is said to be 
clear, when it is not difficult to find and not hidden among other information.49 The same guidelines 
explain that credit information can be seen as concise, when it does not contain lengthy and 
rambling descriptions of credit products. It will be perceived as prominent, when it is not displayed 
in a font size, which is too small.50 These three interpretations of the transparency requirements 
highlight the Commission’s focus on ensuring that the presentation of the mandatory information to 
consumers is transparent. Consequently, the Commission did not interpret any of the transparency 
requirements imposed on the credit information under the CCD as demanding that said information 
is understandable to consumers. Thus, the Commission’s guidance implies that the assessment of 
the credit providers’ compliance with the above-mentioned transparency requirements could be 
limited to the formal transparency test. Credit providers aiming to comply with such an 
interpretation of transparency requirements would then not need to strive for the consumers’ 
understanding of the provided information.51 On the one hand, the authors recognise the practical 
benefits of focusing on formal aspects of transparency, as this facilitates the implementation and 
enforcement of the principle of transparency in the Member States. On the other hand, only through 
the recognition and upholding of substantive requirements of transparency, may the objectives of 
ensuring contract fairness and tackling over-indebtedness be reached. 
Besides the Commission’s guidelines, no other official documents have further explored 
transparency’s concepts. Moreover, the CJEU, when assessing the transparency of mandatory 
information issued by credit providers under the CCD, also did not provide any guidance on the 
relationship between various transparency requirements. The CJEU further neglected to classify 
them as either elements of substantive or formal transparency. Namely, in the Home Credit Slovakia 
case, the CJEU elaborated on a format of a document, in which the contractual credit information 
                                                   
49 European Commission (fn 23) 11. 
50 European Commission (fn 23) 11. 
51 Previously it has been argued that the benchmark of an average consumer as a reasonably well-informed, 
observant and circumspect consumer applies also in the area of financial services, therefore, we are expecting 
transparent terms to be understandable to such consumers, see e.g. Vanessa Mak and Jurgen Braspenning, 
‘Errare Humanum Est: Financial Literacy in European Consumer Credit Law’ (2012) 35(3) Journal of Consumer 
Policy 328-329. The use of a consumer benchmark facilitates enforcement, even though the benchmark could 
be adjusted considering the evidence of high levels of financial illiteracy amongst consumers, see e.g. Mak (fn 
5) 256; Jeffrey Davis, ‘Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the 
Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts’ (1977) 63(6) Virginia Law Review 842-844. 
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had to be provided. In this case, the CJEU tied the requirements of clarity and conciseness together, 
and seemed to assess them only from the formal transparency perspective. It concluded that credit 
provisions, which were contained in more than one document, could still be considered clear and 
concise, as long as the cross-referencing between the documents did not impede the consumer’s 
possibility of being ‘genuinely apprised of all his rights and obligations’.52 The use of the word 
‘apprise’ indicates that, to comply with requirements of clarity and conciseness, it might suffice for 
credit providers to ensure that consumers are simply aware of their rights and obligations. The 
notion does not seem to stretch so far as to require credit providers giving adequate explanations to 
consumers of their rights and obligations.  
This limited scope given to the transparency of credit information seems to be in contrast 
with the CJEU’s case law developed on the basis of the UCTD. The UCTD also imposes on traders an 
obligation to provide consumers with transparent contract terms, which means that these terms 
should be drafted in plain and intelligible language. The difference in the used transparency 
requirements, i.e. plain and intelligible, does not allow to easily transpose their meaning to the 
requirements of clarity, conciseness or prominence of credit information. However, it is crucial to 
observe that the CJEU interpreted transparency requirements of the UCTD as having to satisfy both 
formal and substantive elements of the transparency test. As the UCTD applies also in the area of 
consumer credit contracts, previously the CJEU had to consider whether credit providers adhered to 
their transparency obligations pursuant to the UCTD. The CJEU consistently emphasised in these 
cases that, in order to be considered transparent, a term of a credit contract must enable consumers 
to understand its economic consequences, both on its own and in combination with other 
contractual provisions.53 As the CJEU stated, ‘the requirement of transparency of contractual terms 
laid down by Articles 4(2) and 5 of Directive 93/13, which, moreover, have identical scope, cannot be 
reduced merely to their being formally and grammatically intelligible’.54  
This consideration has not been made in the Home Credit Slovakia case, where the CJEU 
focused on the style of the provision of information rather than its content. Moreover, in the latter 
case the CJEU failed to instruct the national court to also examine the substantive transparency of 
the credit information in cases, where formal transparency has been satisfied. Consequently, the 
CJEU did not instruct national courts to apply the transparency test developed under the UCTD, 
which sufficiently acknowledges the need for the substantive transparency of information. As the 
                                                   
52 Case C-42/15 Home Credit Slovakia EU:C:2016:842, para 34. 
53 Case Kásler (fn 29) para 34; case Matei (fn 29) paras 74-75; Case-96/14 Van Hove EU:C:2015:262, paras 40-
50; Case C-348/14 Bucura EU:C:2015:447, paras 52-56; Case Andriciuc and Others (fn 20) paras 44-48; Case C-
51/17 OTP Bank and OTP Faktoring EU:C:2018:303, paras 71-78; Case C-448/17 EOS KSI Slovensko 
EU:C:2018:745, para 61. 
54 See e.g. case Matei (fn 29) para 73. 
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(pre-)contractual information determines the scope of parties’ rights and obligations similarly to 
standard terms and conditions, a difference in the assessment of the credit provider’s adherence to 
the transparency test under provisions of the UCTD and the CCD does not seem to be justified.  
Instead of at the EU level, laudable examples of an examination of both formal and 
substantive transparency of the credit information can be found at the national level, specifically in 
the case law of the German Supreme Court (further: BGH). For instance, the BGH held that the 
information on the right of withdrawal in consumer credit contracts could be provided by means of 
checkboxes. However, this would only apply if the information was marked sufficiently clearly to 
enable average, reasonably informed and observant consumers to understand it was relevant for 
them and engage with it.55 Therefore, unlike the CJEU, the BGH linked an assessment of the 
appropriateness of the form of the credit information with an evaluation of the possibility of 
consumers to, not only be aware of the information, but also engage with it. At least in some 
Member States, therefore, national enforcement authorities might examine both the substantive 
and formal transparency of the credit information. However, if other Member States favour the 
mere compliance check with formal requirements of the transparency, this might create an uneven 
field in EU consumer credit law for both consumers and credit providers.56 
This concern brings us back to the interpretation of the three transparency requirements in 
the CCD. Namely, in order to ensure fair competition and consumer protection in European 
consumer credit market, it seems necessary that at least one of the three transparency 
requirements imposed by the CCD is expressly interpreted as a requirement of substantive 
transparency. Considering the meaning given to requirements of clarity, conciseness and 
prominence in the everyday language, the requirement of clarity seems most suitable to be 
interpreted as demanding substantive transparency of the credit information. Namely, according to 
the Oxford English dictionary, clear can be understood as, ‘easy to understand, perceive, or 
interpret.’57 Thus, the literal meaning of the requirement of clarity alludes more to the substantive 
rather than formal transparency.  
This argument cannot as easily be made in relation to requirements of conciseness and 
prominence. Following the Oxford dictionary, conciseness embodies, ‘giving a lot of information 
clearly and in a few words; brief but comprehensive’58 and prominence means, ‘situated as to catch 
                                                   
55 See e.g. BGH 23 February 2016, XI ZR 101/15, NJW 2016, 1881; BGH 23 February 2016, XI ZR 549/14, BeckRS 
2016, 7440. 
56 This argument is further developed by contrasting the CJEU’s and Croatian case law on transparency of 
foreign currency loans in Mia Junuzović, ‘The transparency of (pre-) contractual information in consumer credit 
agreements: Is consistency the missing key?’ (2018) 14 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 89-98.  
57 Available at <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/clear> accessed 25 April 2019. 
58 Available at <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/concise> accessed 25 April 2019.  
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the attention; noticeable.’59 Consequently, credit providers could expect requirements of 
conciseness and prominence to represent formal transparency, as these two requirements suggest 
how information should be issued to consumers. This does not preclude a possibility to perceive 
these latter requirements as having an impact on the substantive transparency of the credit 
information, as well. For example, concise credit disclosures should be more easily readable, and, 
therefore, could enhance also the consumers’ understanding of credit terms. After all, the Oxford 
dictionary’s definition even links the notion of conciseness to clarity, warning against the danger of 
prioritising briefness over comprehensiveness. This could further highlight the association between 
formal (conciseness) and substantive (clarity) elements of transparency and the need to satisfy both 
of them.  
 As it has been previously observed, at the moment neither the Commission’s guidelines nor 
the CJEU’s case law distinguish between various transparency requirements and their significance 
for credit providers’ obligations. A useful example of how and why the requirement of prominence 
could be distinguished from the requirement of clarity can again be found in the BGH’s case law. The 
afore-mentioned court rightly noted that the requirement of prominence was not imposed on all 
mandatory credit information but only specific information,60 concerning advertising of a consumer 
credit and overdrafts. Therefore, if the requirement of clarity similarly to the requirement of 
prominence would embody a visual emphasis, any potential benefit of differentiating between 
various pieces of the credit information on the basis of their prominence (or lack thereof) would be 
lost.61 This example outlines the usefulness of distinguishing between various transparency 
requirements. Namely, with a careful consideration of which credit information should be visually 
emphasised, which should be briefer and which needs more elaboration in order to be more 
understandable, one could possibly address at least some of the interdisciplinary criticism of the 
information paradigm.62 
Part 2 of this paper explained why it is necessary from the perspective of reaching the CCD’s 
objectives to ensure that the evaluation of both formal and substantive transparency elements 
occurs in practice. The current paragraph shows that, regrettably, so far, the Commission and the 
CJEU have missed the opportunities to interpret transparency requirements under the CCD as 
demanding that consumers are provided with the comprehensible credit information. The 
Commission seems to have drafted its CCD’s guidelines to facilitate an easy compliance check for 
                                                   
59 Available at <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/prominent> accessed 25 April 2019.  
60 BGH 23 February 2016, XI ZR 101/15, NJW 2016, 1881. 
61 BGH 23 February 2016, XI ZR 101/15, NJW 2016, 1881. 
62 See for further tips on how to improve the design of transparent disclosures: Ognyan Seizov, Alexander J 
Wulf and Joasia Luzak, ‘The Transparent Trap: A Multidisciplinary Perspective on the Design of Transparent 
Online Disclosures in the EU’ (2019) 42 Journal of Consumer Policy 149-173. 
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national enforcement authorities, whilst the CJEU limits its call for the substantive transparency to 
the application of the UCTD. The authors of this paper observed this gap and, on the basis of 
national examples, showed in this paragraph how it could be remedied in practice.  
 
4.2. Representative example 
This paper argues for adopting a European rather than national understanding of transparency 
requirements. To further shed light on the need for more detailed guidance on the European level 
on the principle of transparency, it is, however, necessary to give an example of complications 
arising on the national level from the lack of such a guidance. These are best visible when looking at 
the possibility of informing consumers through the use of a representative example. When credit 
providers advertise a consumer credit referring to the credit’s cost, they need to provide all standard 
information, ‘in a clear, concise and prominent way by means of a representative example.’63 The 
CCD explains that a sufficiently representative example of cost should reflect such considerations as 
the average duration and the total credit’s amount, the frequency of certain types of credit in a 
specific market or, as regards the borrowing rate, the frequency of instalments and the capitalisation 
of interest.64 By using a representative example credit providers should give consumers an accurate 
indication of what their obligations under a credit agreement might be, considering that, until a 
specific consumer credit agreement is concluded and all of its terms and conditions are known, its 
exact costs cannot be determined.65 
The CCD attaches the three above-mentioned transparency requirements to the provision of 
credit information by means of a representative example. The Commission’s guidelines on the 
implementation of the CCD further explain that the purpose of a representative example is to 
facilitate the consumers’ understanding of the APR and the cost of credit.66 Whilst the Commission 
does not attach the function of preserving the substantive transparency to any of the specific 
transparency requirements, it expects that the provided information will somehow achieve that 
objective. This strengthens our previous argument that at least one of the three transparency 
requirements should be interpreted as guaranteeing the substantive transparency.  
Interestingly, the Commission has further specified certain transparency elements of a credit 
disclosure by means of a representative example, e.g., with respect to its prominence. And so, the 
representative example has to clearly mention that it is just a representation of potential credit 
costs, so as not to mislead consumers into thinking that presented costs reflect the actual credit’s 
                                                   
63 Article 4(1) CCD. 
64 Recital 19 Directive CCD. 
65 Recitals 18 and 19 Directive CCD. 
66 European Commission (fn 23) 8. 
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costs, and also to distinguish it from other provided information.67 Whilst the representative 
example needs to be prominent, the guidelines allow other information, unrelated to credit costs, to 
be equally or even more prominent, as long as this does not diminish the clarity of information 
provided by means of a representative example. For instance, a prominent display of the credit 
provider’s logo should neither diminish the formal nor substantive transparency of the 
representative example.68 
Despite more instructions provided on the European level on how to draft a representative 
example, national authorities tasked with implementing the CCD have in some instances provided 
additional guidance to their credit providers on this issue. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (further: DBIS) emphasised that the offer must actually 
be accompanied by the words ‘Representative example’, specifying the requirement on 
distinguishing the example from other provided information.69 The use of such a heading could 
enhance both formal and substantive transparency of the provided information, as it would be more 
visible but also avoid misleading consumers. The DBIS indicated that information should not be 
scattered around the advertisement but appear in the same place, e.g. in a box.70 Additionally, it 
specifies that credit providers should present all mandatory information in an equally prominent 
manner.71 Interestingly, as the implementing measures allow credit providers to include additional 
information regarding the advertised credit, the DBIS suggests that they present this additional 
information in a less prominent way than the mandatory information. When elaborating on the 
requirement of prominence, the DBIS focused on the ability of information to stand out and be 
easily legible or clearly audible to a typical, not an average, consumer. It also emphasised that 
whether the requirement of prominence has been satisfied might depend on the nature and context 
of the medium through which the credit is advertised. Lastly, according to the DBIS the requirement 
of prominence does not require the use of any particular font size. Credit providers may perceive the 
above-mentioned additional instructions on the design of the representative example as elements 
ensuring formal transparency, as they focus on how to display credit information to consumers. 
However, considering the objective of the use of the representative example to enhance the 
consumers’ understanding of credit costs and prevent misleading commercial practices, the authors 
                                                   
67 European Commission (fn 23) 11. 
68 European Commission (fn 23) 11. 
69 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBIS), ‘Consumer Credit Regulation: Guidance on 
the Regulations Implementing the Consumer Credit Directive Updated for EU Commission Directive 
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expect the assessment to encompass substantive transparency, as well. It remains unclear, however, 
which elements the enforcement authorities would place the emphasis on. 
The United Kingdom’s example shows that the Member States could provide further 
requirements as to the understanding of transparency elements. Whilst the need to comply with 
these additional instructions could narrow down the credit providers’ flexibility as to how to disclose 
information, it would guarantee that the assessment of the compliance with the principle of 
transparency would include both its formal and substantive elements. However, for this to occur, 
the national enforcement authorities would need to recognise the importance of both aspects of 
transparency requirements, which has not yet explicitly been done even on the European level. 
 
4.3. Standardisation 
Generally speaking, behavioural studies have widely recognised that standardisation increases the 
disclosures’ transparency.72 Consumers benefit from the uniform information presentation, because 
it allows them to more easily compare available offers.73 On the one hand, standardisation may 
embody formal transparency by prescribing a clear, concise and prominent way to disclose 
information to consumers. On the other hand, it facilitates comparison of various credit offers and 
thus enhances the consumers’ understanding of an offered credit, which signifies the impact of 
standardisation on substantive transparency, as well. The European legislator embraced 
standardisation, aiming to reduce the information complexity in the area of consumer credit.74  
Under the CCD, the pre-contractual information generally has to be provided through the 
Standard European Consumer Credit Information form (SECCI).75 This differs from the regime for 
specific credit agreements, where credit providers were allowed to decide in which form they would 
provide the pre-contractual information. They can choose to disclose the information either in 
another standardised notice called the European Consumer Credit Information form76 or in another 
format, provided, however, that all mandatory information is equally prominently disclosed.77 As 
only the SECCI form is mandatory, the following analysis is limited to implications of the 
standardisation in this form for transparency.  
We could stipulate that the European legislator embraced standardisation of credit 
information as an instrument allowing to increase its transparency, inspired by various behavioural 
                                                   
72 David Horton, 'Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts' (2009) 80(2) University 
of Colorado Law Review 473; Michael G Faure and Hanneke A Luth, 'Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract 
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74 Recitals 19 and 43 CCD; Garcia and van Boom (fn 36) 54-55. 
75 Article 5(1) CCD. 
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77 Article 6(1) CCD. 
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studies. However, this approach has not been adopted full-on, e.g. the length and format of the 
SECCI do not seem to be entirely compatible with lessons learned from behavioural economics. The 
SECCI form, included in an annex to the CCD, slightly surpasses three pages in length. However, this 
is a blank notice, not yet containing information on the credit agreement that parties will conclude. 
A credit provider still needs to fill these three pages with a relevant content, which will considerably 
expand the form’s length. As an example, a completed notice, which consumers will receive when 
they consider getting a credit card with American Express in the UK, has the length of four pages.78  
A pre-contractual information notice of a minimum of three to four pages containing 
information on numerous aspects of consumer credit potentially creates an information overload for 
consumers. The information overload is arguably the most widely recognised and important 
problem consumers face when it comes to mandatory disclosures.79 This, on its own, could pose 
questions as to the effective use of the SECCI form to increase the consumers’ understanding of a 
credit. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such a form could live up to transparency standards set 
by the European legislator, i.e. clarity, conciseness and prominence. Undoubtedly, the European 
legislator aimed for the SECCI form to be clear and concise, and to prominently display the credit 
information. This finding raises the question how much content credit providers could place in the 
form, and in what manner, to remain compliant with the EU transparency requirements. 
Arguably, consumers could also benefit from the fact that the SECCI’s length is not limited, 
as this might enable credit providers to explain the credit information to consumers in a more 
lengthy, but ultimately also more understandable way. Such an assumption disregards, however, 
studies showing that readers have a limited attention span.80  
The possibility of information overload is further heightened by the fact that credit providers 
are allowed to give consumers additional information alongside the mandatory information, as long 
as they issue it in a separate document, annexed to the SECCI form.81 This will further increase the 
documents’ length. For example, the American Express’ notice contains an additional page and a half 
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of disclosures. Separating the mandatory disclosure in the SECCI form from any non-essential 
information may help consumers prioritise their reading of contractual documents. However, the 
flexibility granted to credit providers in issuing additional explanations may also harm the 
consumers’ interest. This is because empirical research shows that additional information might 
distract consumers from the information that is most relevant for their decision-making.82 
Consequently, it might have been a better solution for consumers to be provided with different 
pieces of information at different phases of the contract’s conclusion, instead of receiving a 
consolidated information pack on only one occasion.83  
Besides the length, the format – a table of information – in which credit providers disclose 
information in the SECCI form also deserves consideration. The SECCI form groups the information 
into five categories – the credit provider’s identity and contact details; a description of the product’s 
main features; the credit’s cost; other important legal aspects; and, if applicable, additional 
information in the case of distance marketing of financial services.84 Each category has its own list of 
mandatory information, displayed on the left side of the table, which credit providers need to 
answer on the right side of the table. The table contains additional explanations in relation to the 
meaning of certain terms, such as the total credit amount, the APR, sureties, and explanations on 
how to correctly fill in the table. If the European policymaker believed that the use of a table in the 
SECCI form would increase the disclosure’s transparency, it is surprising that it did not oblige credit 
providers to disclose additional information in the same manner. Perhaps the difference could be 
explained by the varied importance of mandatory versus additional information and the European 
legislator attempting to ensure a more prominent display of the mandatory information through the 
use of the SECCI form. This difference in display could also allow consumers to more easily identify 
disclosures that credit providers make as required by law from disclosures they choose to add. The 
European legislator does not mention, however, that a display of the additional information should 
be less prominent than that of the mandatory information.  
Moreover, it appears that the findings of the Commission’s very own behavioural research 
were neglected when designing the SECCI form. Namely, the testing of the information notice 
drafted for the purposes of the European Common Sales Law showed that tables are considered 
‘significantly less clearly written and easy to understand’.85 Furthermore, it was discovered that 
consumers are less likely to perceive information as presented, ‘in logical order and sensibly 
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structured’, when it was displayed in a text box.86 There is nothing in the Commission’s guidelines 
indicating that, despite of the results of its very own research, the text box format was not 
abandoned since other research confirms its effectiveness.  
Lastly, although the CCD recognises that the use of certain distance communication 
measures, e.g. smartphones, does not support full disclosure, allowing credit providers in such cases 
to limit the amount of the disclosed information,87 it does not regulate the particularities of 
transparent online disclosure. Behavioural research, rather unambiguously, suggests it should. 
Studies show that consumers display significantly less engagement and caution in the online 
environment.88 Even if the European legislator prescribed the use of the table in the SECCI form in 
order to increase the disclosures’ legibility, it ignored the question where on the credit provider’s 
website it should be placed, when it should be presented, whether it should be in a browse-wrap or 
a click-wrap format, etc.  
If we again take a look at the American Express notice on the UK website of the company, 
they disclose the SECCI form once consumers decide to apply for a credit card. Before consumers fill 
in their personal details, American Express presents them with an information box, on the right side 
of which five important documents are disclosed via a link, one of which is the SECCI form. Once 
consumers click on this link, they have to click on another link entitled ‘View PDF’ in order to access 
the SECCI form. Unfortunately, consumers have no obligation to click on any of the links and can 
proceed with their application without actually accessing the SECCI form, by simply clicking on the 
‘Get started’ button. Thus, we may question whether the credit provider, American Express, has 
sufficiently drawn the consumers’ attention to the SECCI form, ensuring a prominent display thereof. 
Especially, since the consumers’ attention is not drawn to the existence and availability of the SECCI 
form in particular, let alone its relevance, but merely to the existence of several informative 
documents.  
The European legislator perceives standardised information as transparent information.89 
Scholars often share this view and thus it is not particularly contentious.90 However, as the authors 
have shown above, the standardised credit information notice envisaged under the CCD does not 
seem to incorporate findings of empirical research concerning the effective presentation of 
information to consumers. On the contrary, in some aspects, it might even run counter to them. 
Furthermore, what could be especially problematic in achieving greater transparency through 
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standardisation is that the legislator does not rely on this tool in a consistent manner. As long as the 
European legislator does not oblige credit providers to disclose consumer information in the same 
manner at every stage of the (pre-)contractual process, does not give credit providers specific 
guidelines as to online disclosures, and allows them to impose additional information requirements, 
we can hardly expect meaningful standardisation of information in practice. Moreover, at the 
moment standardisation focuses on formal rather than substantive transparency, considering that it 
dictates credit providers in which form to relay the mandatory information to consumers, rather 
than its content.  
A tool that could be used to ameliorate the possibly insufficient consideration of the 
substantive transparency within the realm of the SECCI form, but at the same time which further 
undermines the concept of information standardisation, is the credit provider’s duty to provide 
adequate explanations of the (pre-)contractual consumer credit information. Article 5(6) CCD 
introduces this obligation with the aim of enabling consumers to evaluate the suitability of a 
proposed credit contract to their financial needs and situation. Unfortunately, the CCD does not 
further specify when and to what extent adequate explanations of the credit information have to be 
given nor how they impact the effectiveness of information standardisation. The CJEU related the 
credit providers’ duty to provide adequate explanations to their obligation to assess the consumer’s 
creditworthiness in the case CA Consumer Finance.91 Consequently, to provide adequate 
explanations of credit products to consumers, credit providers have to consider any relevant 
information stemming from the creditworthiness assessment.92 Whilst adequate explanations 
theoretically could be given to consumers before the creditworthiness assessment occurs, its results 
might require credit providers to adjust their content.93 In practice, credit providers would then 
likely issue such explanations after the creditworthiness assessment had already been conducted, 
which, in any case, should take place in good time before the signing of a credit agreement.94 The 
CJEU clarified, therefore, the moment of the provision of adequate explanations and the credit 
providers’ obligation to make their content relevant for individual consumers. Further regulation of 
this obligation has so far been left entirely up to the Member States, including taking a decision on 
the form, in which credit providers should issue such adequate explanations to consumers.95  
The UK example illustrates how the duty to provide adequate explanations of (pre-
)contractual credit information can be given a significant role in ensuring greater substantive 
transparency of said information. The regulation and enforcement of the duty at hand has been 
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delegated to the Financial Conduct Authority (further: FCA), which introduced the obligation of 
credit providers to always adequately explain to consumers the mandatory (pre-)contractual credit 
information.96 The FCA specified this duty, e.g. by obliging credit providers to advise consumers to 
take their time to consider the information and to enable them to ask questions.97 It also provided 
guidance on how to establish the extent, to which credit information has to be explained, by 
considering characteristics of an agreement such as the type of credit, amount and duration, risks 
for the consumer, the level of the consumer’s understanding of the agreement, etc.98 Finally, the 
FCA obliged credit providers not to omit explaining the relevant credit information, even if 
consumers claimed there was no need for such explanations.99  
Whilst the UK approach to the regulation of the credit providers’ duty to provide adequate 
explanations of consumer credit products might be used as an example of good practices, it remains 
problematic that such a regulation does not exist at the EU level. If consumers are given further 
explanations of credit products in one Member State and are simply provided with the SECCI form in 
another, it is doubtful whether they could meaningfully understand and compare credit products 
available in different Member States. This could lead to consumers opting for a less suitable product 
simply because they understand its characteristics better, as well as obfuscate the overall 
transparency of the consumer credit market.  
 
5. Addressing three transparency problems 
The previous part has identified three major problems with the current application of the principle 
of transparency in the consumer credit area: the lack of clarity as to the formal or substantive 
character of its requirements; the disconnected nomenclature of the transparency test’s 
requirements; and, the confused application of the information standardisation in credit disclosures. 
The first major inconsistency that should be addressed is the disconnect between the CCD’s 
objectives and the current interpretation of the transparency requirements by the Commission, as 
well as the CJEU. As we have illustrated in part 2, to reach the CCD’s objectives national enforcement 
authorities would need to evaluate the credit providers’ compliance with both formal and 
substantive transparency elements. As mentioned in part 4.1 of the paper, the three main 
transparency requirements, clarity, conciseness and prominence are elements of either formal or 
substantive transparency. The Commission’s guidelines, erroneously in the authors’ opinion, focus 
solely on their formal expression. Unfortunately, the CJEU has also not yet clearly defined 
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transparency requirements under the CCD nor comprehensively interpreted them. Yet, its case law 
on consumer credit evaluated under the provisions of the UCTD suggests that, in order to be 
transparent, credit agreements would need to satisfy both formal and substantive elements of 
transparency. In order to provide a consistent and comprehensive interpretation of the principle of 
transparency, we would like to see the CJEU extend the understanding of this principle awarded 
under the UCTD’s provisions also to case law interpreting the CCD’s provisions. Furthermore, in the 
ongoing revision of the CCD, we implore the Commission to consider explicitly stating the double 
function of the principle of transparency. Only by assuring information transparency in both its 
formal and substantive meaning, the full effect may be given to the CCD’s objectives. 
Secondly, we are recommending the Commission and the CJEU to clarify the specific 
character of the three main transparency requirements, which should strengthen the coherency of 
the legislator’s toolbox and increase legal certainty. First, the Commission and the CJEU could 
explicitly state that the requirements of clarity, conciseness and prominence are always to be jointly 
examined in the assessment of the credit provider’s compliance with their obligation to provide 
transparent consumer disclosures. If we consider the dictionary meaning of the transparency 
requirements envisaged by the CCD, as presented in part 4, we can distinguish between formal and 
substantive aspects of transparency. For example, the requirement of prominence, which demands 
that information is noticeable, more easily corresponds to formal transparency. Contrarily, the 
requirement of clarity demands that information is easily understood, perceived and interpreted, 
which seems to represent substantive transparency.100 Conciseness breaches this divide, as it 
demands brief and comprehensive disclosure of a large amount of information, which requires credit 
providers to draft and issue information in a particular manner, whilst still keeping it comprehensible 
to consumers. If conciseness was always to be examined jointly with clarity, then we would suggest 
that the Commission and the CJEU should perceive conciseness as a requirement of formal 
transparency and clarity – of substantive transparency. Despite the complex interaction of various 
transparency requirements, the Commission and the CJEU should attempt to separate them, whilst 
recognising their influence on one another. This would allow the relationship between formal and 
substantive elements of transparency to be determined more precisely and to acknowledge that 
compliance with only one side of the principle of transparency is insufficient for reaching the CCD’s 
objectives. 
Finally, the Commission should reconsider the use of standardised information obligations, 
such as the introduction of the SECCI form. In case their use is empirically confirmed to either 
increase the consumers’ understanding of credit offers or to facilitate their comparison, 
                                                   
100 In contrast to what the European institutions seem to suggest in their guidelines to the CCD, see European 
Commission (fn 23) 11. 
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standardisation should become a more streamlined and enhanced tool for the European legislator. 
This means it should not only apply to the form of the information credit providers issue to 
consumers, but also to the content of this information. 
 
6. Conclusions 
On the basis of the CCD, credit providers have various information duties with different transparency 
requirements imposed on them, depending on the stage of contracting. Whilst credit providers have 
to specify information in a clear, concise and prominent manner by means of a representative 
example in the advertising stage of consumer credit, in the pre-contractual stage, in most cases, they 
have to issue it on the SECCI form. Once the contract has been concluded, the information it 
contains has to be clear and concise. There are only general Commission’s guidelines on various 
transparency requirements, many of which may have the same meaning. These guidelines do not 
address the relationship between the formal and substantive transparency elements but seem to 
recommend the assessment of the credit providers’ compliance with only formal elements of 
transparency. Furthermore, the standardisation of information provision seems to be aimed at 
increasing the information transparency, but the European legislator has not been using it 
consistently and also designed it in a way facilitating mostly formal transparency.  
On the basis of the above-presented analysis and with a view to the ongoing review of the 
CCD, the first point to be made is that it could be beneficial to use one transparency toolbox, i.e. to 
limit and explain the terminology of transparency requirements. If the European legislator continues 
to use a few modalities, such as, clear, concise and prominent, then it should define them separately 
and clarify whether they need to be satisfied cumulatively. Moreover, the Commission should then 
interpret them in line with the legislator’s objectives, as the authors have done in this paper. This 
means that aside from the modalities for formal transparency, such as prominence and likely also 
conciseness, substantive transparency needs to be recognised in the requirement of clarity. This 
would allow to further delineate the relationship between the formal and substantive requirements 
of transparency. In the CJEU’s case law on the provision of information in credit agreements such a 
clear delineation of formal and substantive aspects of transparency is, so far, missing, as well.101  
The second point we make in this paper is that if scholars further prove standardisation to 
be an effective measure, which increases the disclosures’ transparency, the European legislator 
should further attempt to standardise credit disclosures. Moreover, it should then be recommended 
to standardise not only the form of the credit information but also its content.  
                                                   
101 The CJEU has recently further elaborated on the difference between formal and substantive elements of 
transparency in the mortgage loan cases such as in Joined cases C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15 Gutiérrez 
Naranjo EU:C:2016:980, paras 48-50. 
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Coming back to the core question of this paper, the relationship between formal and 
substantive transparency requirements, it is without doubt insufficient to provide a concise and 
prominent disclosure but write it in an unclear, unintelligible manner, hindering the consumers’ 
understanding thereof. There is less clarity as to consequences for credit providers who would 
provide a lengthy disclosure, lacking in consistency, but which would be nonetheless easily 
understandable to consumers. However, we have argued that due to the information overload 
consumers are less likely to read lengthy disclosures, which means that a simple breach of only 
formal transparency requirements would also likely harm consumers. Even if the objective of the 
CCD was only to increase consumer protection, then it still would be difficult to argue that 
substantive elements of transparency should prevail over the formal ones. Moreover, such a 
reasoning would ignore the other objective of the CCD, namely, of securing a transparent and 
effective credit market. The formalities around consumer credit disclosures have been designed to 
facilitate the ease of comparisons among various credit offers and to ensure fair competition in the 
credit market. This goal could be undermined if credit providers were allowed to deviate from the 
formal transparency requirements, knowing they could prove the consumers’ understanding of 
credit terms. As long as the objectives of the CCD are kept in mind, it is easy to determine that credit 
providers need to satisfy both formal and substantive elements of transparency. 
Therefore, it seems imperative to retain both the more formal elements of transparency, 
such as the requirement of a concise and prominent disclosure or the standardised disclosures, on 
the one hand, and the more substantive element of clarity, on the other hand. Fulfilment of the one 
set of transparency requirements would not seem to be able to excuse an infringement of the other 
type. It does not seem necessary to keep the lines blurred on the European regulatory level, which 
allows the credit market to continue to be shaped differently by national enforcement authorities, 
as presented in part 4 of this paper. Hence, we are asking for further transparency as to the meaning 
of the principle of transparency. 
